

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 EUR-10 AF-04 CIAE-00 INR-10

NSAE-00 RSC-01 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-03 L-02 EB-03 PM-03

H-01 RSR-01 PRS-01 /070 W

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R 140700Z JUL 73

FM USINT CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3415

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T CAIRO 2123

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EG

SUBJECT: CALL ON MINISTER OF INFORMATION, MOURAD GHALEB

1. ON JULY 12, I PAID A CALL ON MINISTER OF INFORMATION MOURAD GHALEB, THE FORMER EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER. WE HAD A WIDE-RANGING AND INFORMAL DISCUSSION WHICH LASTED FOR ALMOST ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS. WE STARTED BY EXCHANGING THE STANDARD POSITIONS OF OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ON THE NEXT STEPS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE PROSPECTS FOR EGYPTIAN-LIBYA MERGER. WE ALSO DISCUSSED LONGER RANGE TRENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA. FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT POINTS EMERGED:

A) QADHAAFI AND SADAT DURING THEIR TALKS ON THE MERGER HAD BEEN UNABLE TO AGREE ON A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE NEW STATE, INCLUDING SUCH IMPORTANT SUBJECTS AS A

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SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND ARAB-SOVIET RELATIONS. THEY HAD ALSO DISAGREED ON THE NEED FOR A CULTURAL REVOLUTION

IN EGYPT AND ON QADHAAFI'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE THIRD WAY. GHALEB SAW LITTLE PROSPECT THAT EITHER SADAT OR QADHAAFI WOULD BACK DOWN FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE WERE POWERFUL FORCES WORKING IN SUPPORT OF A MERGER, AND GHALEB THOUGHT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CONTINUE. HE SAID THAT A SERIES OF ALTERNATIVES HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO SADAT BY HIS CABINET, INCLUDING ONE OPTION OF LEAVING RELATIONS AS THEY ARE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND GRADUALLY EXPANDING COOPERATION ON AN INSTITUTION TO INSTITUTION BASIS. OTHER OPTIONS INVOLVED HOLDING A PLEBISCITE AND FORMATION OF A FEDERAL PARLIAMENT AND CABINET BY SEPTEMBER 1. GHALEB DID NOT KNOW WHICH OPTION SADAT WOULD SELECT. HE SAID NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE RESUMED IN AUGUST WHEN SADAT IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT TRIPOLI.

B) ON THE QUESTION OF FUTURE ARAB POLICIES, GHALEB WAS PESSIMISTIC. HE SAID THAT EGYPTIANS AND OTHER ARABS FELT LET DOWN BY BOTH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THAT MOST LIKELY RESULT WOULD BE A DECISION THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. I REPLIED THAT IF THIS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ARABS SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TO SEEK A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, I WAS CERTAIN THAT THE USG WOULD BE PLEASED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT. GHALEB REPLIED THAT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ARABS WOULD FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD NOW TAKE NEGATIVE RATHER THAN POSITIVE STEPS AND THAT US INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY OIL, MIGHT SUFFER EVEN THOUGH ARAB ECONOMIC INTERESTS WOULD ALSO BE HURT. HE SAID IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT TO ARAB WORLD THAT USG WAS PURSUING INCOMPATIBLE POLICIES IN SUPPORTING ISRAEL MILITARILY AGAINST THE ARABS AND AT SAME TIME ATTEMPTING TO SECURE FUTURE ENERGY SUPPLIES IN THE ARAB WORLD. ARABS WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUDE THAT USG HAS BEEN UNMOVED BY ARGUMENTS BASED ON JUSTICE AND LOGIC OF ARAB CAUSE, AND THAT ONLY WAY TO AFFECT UNITED STATES ATTITUDES WOULD BE NEGATIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST US ECONOMIC INTERESTS. I POINTED OUT TO GHALEB THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT INSENSITIVE TO CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND THAT

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ARABS WOULD MAKE MUCH MORE PROGRESS WITH THE UNITED STATES BY ARGUING THEIR CASE CONSTRUCTIVELY RATHER THAN BY ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT WOULD CREATE BACKLASH AGAINST ARABS IN US PUBLIC OPINION. I ADDED THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE QUICK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED BY SUCH ACTIONS AND WOULD POINT TO THEM AS EVIDENCE THAT ARABS ARE DANGEROUS AND UNRELIABLE PEOPLE WHO CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP THEIR AGREEMENTS. GHALEB AGREED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE NET RESULT, BUT IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED, IT WAS

MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT ARABS WOULD PURSUE A POLICY OF  
NEGATIVE SANCTIONS RATHER THAN CONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENTA-  
TION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

2. GHALEB ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF IMPROVED US-EGYPTIAN  
CONTACTS WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING HAFEZ  
ISMAIL'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON. I REPLIED THAT WE WERE  
READY TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (GHALEB DEMURRED  
ON GROUNDS POLITICAL CLIMATE IS NOT YET RIPE) AND WERE  
PREPARED TO REVITALIZE THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION.  
GHALEN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE LATTER AND SAID HE WOULD  
PURSUE THE SUBJECT WITHIN THE GOE.

3. COMMENT; GHALEB IMPRESSED ME AS A SOPHISTICATED  
AND EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT WHO IS BOTH SELF CONFIDENT AND  
OPEN MINDED. HE OBVIOUSLY ENJOYS FREE WHEELING  
DISCUSSIONS ON THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF EGYPT AND THE  
MIDDLE EAST.  
WILEY

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